Is Gradual Disempowerment on the Radar of the Abrahamic Religions?

A first pass survey of how authoritative religious statements from within the Abrahamic religions engage (or not) with the Gradual Disempowerment (GD) threat.

David Leech, Alexandra

9/8/202611 min read

Bottom Line

The world's religious traditions have started to make authoritative religious statements about advanced AI threats. We have read the authoritative religious statements we could find, and have asked a narrow question of them: to what extent does one specific concern, gradual human disempowerment (GD) in the sense defined by Kulveit et al.(2025), show up in them?

Kulveit et al. define GD as an impersonal drift-like process, distinct from both the deliberate misuse and autonomous misalignment scenarios, by which the three key societal systems of the economy, culture, and states could become gradually misaligned with human interests. GD is not driven by bad actors or the result of power concentration, but instead represents a ‘boiling the frog’ scenario which may result in a range of negative outcomes on a par with those which could result from the more familiar power concentration, deliberate misuse and autonomous misalignment scenarios.

In short, we did not find evidence that GD shows up strongly in these statements. Sometimes this is because the statements were more narrowly focussed on other threats and we should therefore not expect discussion of GD. Where it does show up – and it was most pronounced in some of the Orthodox sources and, more equivocally, in parts of the Catholic sources – we rarely find discussion of mechanisms by which GD may occur. Again, this is perhaps unsurprising, given the purposes of the statements. That said, the concept of GD seems to be present, at least in some of the sources, even where it is not explicitly articulated, and we predict that future statements of the Abrahamic religions on advanced AI threats may bring the concept more explicitly into focus.

However, GD passages were difficult to identify with confidence. This was mostly due to the fact that mentions of harmful developments rarely disambiguated between when these were driven by bad actors – this would make them a case of power concentration or deliberate misuse – and when they represent impersonal drift (GD developments in the proper sense). This meant that many passages admitted of multiple readings. On a final manual check, we also excluded a fairly large set of passages from the Catholic source Quo Vadis Humanitas concerning critiques of trans-/post-humanism which seemed to assume human steerage rather than drift. After this final check, GD extracts comprised only ~0.7% of the ~1790 passages we coded if we counted only those extracts which were unambiguously GD, and this rose to ~5% when we counted extracts which were plausibly interpreted as GD but also admitted of other readings. Either way, concern with GD appears marginal in this set of authoritative religious statements overall.

Note: we have restricted our analysis to the major Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam).

Methodology

To evaluate how religious statements engage with AI risks, we adopted a sequential qualitative-to-quantitative mixed-methods design across primary authoritative texts spanning Catholic, Protestant, Islamic, Jewish, and Eastern Orthodox traditions. Non-Abrahamic traditions were excluded due to structural differences in institutional authority.

  • Extraction & Unitization (N = 1790): Texts were segmented into standardized data extracts using explicit word limits and rhetorical-shift rules to isolate individual arguments, claims, and justifications.

  • Coding Schema: Claims were mapped using a multi-level taxonomy adapting secular AI safety frameworks (Kulveit et al.) to religious discourse. The schema spans 5 Macro-Domains (D1–D5), 6 Argumentative Moves (M1–M6), 5 Risk-Vector categories (including Gradual Disempowerment), 22 Policy sub-codes across 5 domains, and structural flags capturing mechanism presence, religious authority level and target stakeholders.

  • Two-Phase Human-in-the-Loop Verification: Initial broad-recall extraction and classification were assisted by an LLM prompted with a frozen codebook. To ensure high precision and eliminate false positives, every extract underwent a complete manual verification pass by the research team.

The full methodology, document authority metadata, variable taxonomy, and deliberative design logs (JSON) are available on [Link].

Judaism

The two authoritative sources we read for Judaism are juridical responsa, one representing Conservative Judaism, Daniel Nevins’ ‘Halakhic Responses to Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Machines’ (2019) https://new.rabbinicalassembly.org/node/48892, issued by the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards; the other a Reformed Jewish Responsum 5784.2, "Artificial Intelligence and Authorship" (2025) https://www.ccarnet.org/ccar-responsa/5784-2-artificial-intelligence-and-authorship/ on legitimate use of AI in authorship, issued by the Central Conference of American Rabbis.

Jewish authority structures are decentralised. As Kalman observes, anybody with a strong understanding of Jewish law can seek to speak with authority on the topic (they do not need to be recognised as a religious leader).

The limited existing literature on Judaism and AI emphasises that the debate has not yet matured, or has barely even started, and it is difficult to predict how it will develop. Kalman for instance states that ‘neither Jews or Jewish thought really know what they think about AI just yet [and] ‘the’ AI conversation is in fact non-existent’ (70).

The register of existing Jewish authoritative engagements with advanced AI is juridical, and is expressed in terms of Jewish law (halakhah). The two authoritative sources we read are focused on Jews and Jewish obligations in particular rather than humans in general – for instance, whether a Jew can use an agential AI to do work for them on Shabbat (this is similar to the Islam sources too, see below). As Kalman notes, Jewish law is almost entirely concerned with the moral intentions and actions of individuals rather than with states and corporations. This also sets limits to the extent to which we can expect Jewish legal sources to take positions on what should be done at the level of states and corporations to mitigate GD.

The sources also look for Jewish legal precedents concerning erstwhile new technologies (for instance, the acceptable use of waterwheels, e.g. on Shabbat, as there is no scriptural precedent). They mostly display a concern with whether Jews are responsible for, and can be held liable for, the actions of AIs, and in which case, who (end users, developers?); and the moral limits of delegation of human work to AI, e.g. in the case of autonomously driving cars or the use of lethal weapons. In fact there are few passages in these two authoritative Jewish sources which engage GD in an unambiguous way.

CCAR is engaged very specifically with the question of whether a rabbi may take direct credit for AI-generated work (poetry as part of minyan). This falls under AI ethics (MG) and unsurprisingly, no GD passages were identified.

CJLS contains some passages which are tangentially GD related, but again, concern with GD is quite indirect. Nevins expresses the concern that ‘the border between “natural” and “artificial” intelligence is eroding...[h]umans depend upon artificial intelligence for a bewildering array of activities’ (3). This can certainly be interpreted as an instance of GD, although it is not conceptualised as such, and is discussed in the context of a need to integrate moral reasoning into AIs rather than of a concern that humans will become disempowered in a gradual boiling-a-frog way.

The following passage is more strongly GD-flavoured, even if it is not identified in GD terms explicitly: ‘Given that computers can process some data sets far faster than humans can, the temptation is great to move people out of the decision‐making loop…This would lead to a fully autonomous system, even if humans continue to set goals and review results.’ (5). Similarly, Nevins refers with concern to ‘trends in advanced economies to rely on such systems in place of humans, whose assistance may be costlier, less readily available, and perhaps less reliable.’

Islam

Islamic religious authority structures are also decentralised. The two genuinely authoritative sources we read are juridical: a Dar al-Ifta fatwa https://www.dar-alifta.org/en/fatwa/details/22255/using-ai-applications-to-obtain-fatwas (2025) and an International Islamic Fiqh Academy resolution https://iifa-aifi.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/ACADEMY-NEWS-ISSUE-N57.pdf (2025). Like the Jewish responsa, they are narrowly focussed on specific issues, and neither engages GD directly.

The Dar al-Ifta fatwa states that it is impermissible in Islamic law to rely on AIs to obtain a fatwa noting only that no current AIs have achieved the relevant competences for issuing fatwas, and do not have a mufti’s qualifications for doing so. The fatwa rules that only humans, not AIs, can issue fatwas, but on competence grounds rather than out of concern for gradual disempowerment. The Fiqh Academy resolution rules in general terms that AI use is permissible provided it is used for good ends, but does not address GD.

Given the absence of references to GD in these, we also read the Riyadh Charter [link to add], an Islamic-world intergovernmental charter issued in 2024 by the Islamic World Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (ICESCO) and the Saudi Data and Artificial Intelligence Authority (SDAIA). This is not a religiously authoritative source itself but it is ‘widely recognised and endorsed by Islamic scholars and policymakers’, and was a source for the Fiqh Academy 2025 ruling.

The Riyadh Charter implicitly expresses concern about GD; for instance, it signals concern about the increasing increasing reliance on AI from a young age, plausibly stunting a range of human capabilities and leading to diminished human agency. The charter also states that AI solutions should only be used when they are ‘relevant and … cannot be achieved by human or low tech means’, or when human involvement is not ‘essential to the task’. This, in the form of a prohibition, implicitly expresses a concern about gradual replacement of human labour. The charter furthermore insists that AI must not replace human authority or ‘reduc[e] the ability of humans to determine their own lives and collective destinies’; and it should always ‘collaborate with humans rather than replace them on socially important tasks’. It also issues this warning: ‘[w]e should be careful that the development of AI systems does not undermine the capacity of the preservation of essential social relations providing the context of human flourishing, the political institutions providing its stability, the traditions and cultural heritage defining its identity’. Given the lack of reference to bad actors, it seems more natural to read this as a GD warning.

Nevertheless, the presence of concern about GD is more implicit than explicit in the charter as a whole, and cannot always be cleanly distinguished from adjacent AI threat categories. Also, the charter does not discuss possible GD mechanisms (unless we interpret increasing reliance on AI from a young age as a named GD mechanism).

Orthodox Christianity

We read two sources, both primatial addresses – a keynote to a meeting of the World Council of Religions for Peace (2025) https://ec-patr.org/29/07/11/39/, and an address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2025) http://ec-patr.org/74696-2/ by the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I of Contantinople, the highest ranking primate of Eastern Orthodox Christianity. It should be noted, however, that both sources are speeches rather than synodal or conciliar doctrine, so they do not have the equivalent authority of publications such as papal encyclicals in the Catholic Christian tradition. The Eastern Orthodox Church has not yet articulated its position(s) on Artificial Intelligence at the authoritative level of the Catholic Church.

The Council of Europe address does not touch on GD. By contrast, the keynote to the World Council of Religions for Peace is unusually explicit about GD threats among the authoritative religious sources we have read. Bartholomew refers to ‘erosion of human agency’ among his concerns about the development of AI. In the context of expressing concern about algorithms which can reinforce existing injustices, Bartholomew speaks about advanced AI instituting an ‘invisible, but omnipotent, web of control’; a concern that human judgment could be replaced by AI; and that persons will ‘shrink[] into a set of data’. Most directly, he warns that humans are ‘in danger of losing not only the control of [their] tools, but the very sense of what it means to be human’.

While these passages could be interpreted as a concern about power concentration, no bad actors are identified and the concern reads more naturally as about an impersonal GD threat.

Protestant Christianity

The sources we read for Protestant Christianity are denominational statements, including the Southern Baptist Convention’s Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission statement ‘Artificial Intelligence: An Evangelical Statement of Principles’ (2019)https://erlc.com/policy-content/artificial-intelligence-an-evangelical-statement-of-principles/; the Southern Baptist Convention resolution on On Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technologies (2023) https://www.sbc.net/resource-library/resolutions/on-artificial-intelligence-and-emerging-technologies/; and the Church of England’s General Synod affirmation on work, dignity and AI (2024) https://www.churchofengland.org/media/press-releases/synod-affirms-work-key-human-dignity-and-purpose-face-ai-revolution.

The most direct expression of a GD concern is the Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission’s insistence that humans should not ‘use AI...as a reason to move toward lives of pure leisure’ (Southern Baptist Convention). While this is not a catastrophic GD scenario, it is a ‘human zoo’ variety of GD scenario where humans are materially provided for but stripped of meaningful participation in society. However, this threat may be framed here as something which results from the sinful tendencies of humans – i.e. they are tempted by a life of pure leisure - rather than from an impersonal set of processes which happen to them without their awareness or control. In this sense, it is not a ‘pure’ expression of GD. We did not find any GD-relevant passages in the Southern Baptist Convention resolution (2023). The 2024 Church of England Synod noted the absence of safeguards for ‘human purpose and dignity in work’ in the face of AI replacement, and the lack of a plan about how to compensate those who lose out.

Catholic Christianity

The Catholic Church has produced by far the largest and in-depth set of statements on threats from Artificial Intelligence, in the form of the papal encyclical Magnifica Humanitas (2026) https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiv/en/encyclicals/documents/20260515-magnifica-humanitas.html; the dicastery note Antiqua et Nova (2025) https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_ddf_doc_20250128_antiqua-et-nova_en.html; and the International Theological Commission’s Quo vadis, humanitas? (2026) https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_cti_doc_20260304_quo-vadis-humanits_en.html

Antiqua et Nova has a well-developed defence of the dignity of human work, and warns that AI may replace rather than complement human labour. Drawing on the concept of idolatry, it states that humanity may become ‘enslaved to its own work’ as a result of treating AI as a substitute for God. It interprets such developments as a logical consequence of what it identifies as a ‘technocratic paradigm’, which the church opposes, and it expresses concern that human labour ‘may lose its value in the economic realm’ and become ‘enslaved to efficiency’ (this is similar to the disempowerment scenarios in the economic domain outlined by Kulveit et al.). Again, the dicastery note does not imply that these developments are driven by bad actors, so these claims are best read as expressing GD concerns.

The papal encyclical Magnifica Humanitas – the highest authority source we consulted – expresses a deep concern that humans may gradually lose the desire to form human communections (similarly to Kulveit et al. on disempowerment in the cultural domain), that important decisions may be ‘fully delegated to automated systems’, and that due to algorithmic biases, injustices can ‘go[] unnoticed, and compassion, mercy and forgiveness...gradually disappear from view.’ Leo also expresses concern that a society in which there is massive work replacement by AI ‘risks exposing many to forced inactivity... resulting in human and cultural impoverishment.’, whether in a catastrophic or in a ‘human zoo’ manner.


Quo Vadis Humanitas expresses concern about technological change that ‘seems to be spiralling out of control’ in a GD sense. The document also discusses the ‘uncontrollable evolution of machines ... which could lead to the creation of autonomous entities capable of determining the future and dominating the planet.’ However, this latter concern probably be read as a mixed GD and automonous misaligment one, as it appears to refer to superintelligent machines which may be misaligned with human interests.


Ecumenical Christian responses


Finally, we looked at an ecumenical source, the World Council of Churches’ Statement on the Unregulated Development of Artificial Intelligence (2023) https://www.oikoumene.org/resources/documents/statement-on-the-unregulated-development-of-artificial-intelligence. This document may express a specifically religious-domain GD concern where it states that the human interactions which make up the ‘work of the churches’ may be displaced by AI ‘facsimiles’, but it is otherwise more focussed on other advanced AI threats.

Note: the Catholic Church is not a member of the World Council of Churches, although it engages with the World Council via a Joint Working Group.


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The sources we read across the three major Abrahamic traditions suggest that the GD threat currently is rather weakly attested compared to other AI threats, or it is only implicit, although it is more explicit in the Catholic and Orthodox Christian sources. This should not be surprising, given that GD is identified as a neglected AI threat by Kulveit et al., and the concept does not yet have much currency. This is also a first pass at a moving target – while we make no claim to have been exhaustive in our identification of authoritative religious statements on advanced AI, we are not aware of having missed any significant ones to date. However, we expect that the Abrahamic religions will continue to publish authoritative religious statements on AI, and the picture may well change as this happens. We’d value pushback on the passages we have interpreted as GD, as some of these could admit of other interpretations.